really? I think it’s pretty good, I’ve been watching them today too.

Well... I've studied philosophy and psychology in a university so maybe that's why lol

I've studied philosophy of religion and pretty much knew everything that was going to fly out of Harris' mouth

I think that discussion is well above most people’s intelligence level

Perhaps...

Peterson's defenses of his faith position were pitiful

all the while when Harris opened his mouth i had to try very hard to keep myself awake lol

I understand where Jordan is coming from, its hard to pinpoint exactly where he is wrong. I think Peterson is wrong just because my beliefs align more with Sam’s but I haven’t finished part 2 yet

I love listening to Sam though he’s hilarious.

His analogies hit hard

One thing that I've learned from studying is that if it is hard to pinpoint where an argument is wrong, then the argument is not well understood, even by the person making it.

Peterson is no exception to this.

I agree. This is a difficult topic though. Been having arguments about its for thousands of years.

It’s a much more productive debate/conversation than most I’ve seen though.

So, that begs the question. If any argument can be made to be so strong that it becomes increasingly more difficult, if not impossible to point to a false premise, why believe in any argument?

And on the flip side, if one argument can be looked at as having all true premises and a true conclusion, yet any premise can be objected as being false, how can any argument be truly said to be sound?

Validity: an argument is valid if and only if the premises do not yield a false conclusion.

Soundness: an argument is sound if and only if all of the premises being true necessitate the conclusoin being true.

The problem here is that we have no idea if any premises of any argument are actually true so long as any premise of any argument can be objected as false.

In order for a premise of any argument to be true, it must rule out any and all possibility of it being false.

But, since it is not the case that any argument can rule out any of its premises are not false, we have a problem.

It remains to be seen if even a God(s) could solve this issue...

P> Q
Q>R
R>S
S>T
Therefore, T

Yet, even the first premise of the argument can be objected as being false.

Okay so how do you apply that to Peterson’s argument

Well... if you want to apply that to Peterson's argument, just plug and chug lol

He makes several claims attempting to defend the truth of scripture, yet when he claims truth, he cannot rule out every objection to any premise of his argument as not being false.

For example, let's say that premise 1 has a probability of being 5% false. Well, so long as there is a probability of a premise being false, it by definition cannot be true because true premises are not possible to be false.

A probability of a thing is simply the margin of error that can be allowed, and as long as there is a margin of error, we cannot know if anything in an argument is true because the supposed truth value of a premise would need to be independent of any error margin.

In other words, to say that something is true is to suggest that there are no other possibilities for it to not be the case... yet if there is always the possibility for it to not be the case, then it is not independent of any and all margins of error.

Quite the paradox...

Peterson attempted to use field data found by Jane Goodall as a building block of a metaphysics, yet metaphysics is just as specious as epistemology, logic, and ethics.

Let me ask this of the metaphysicians... 1) why does metaphysics matter? 2) what exactly is supposed to be different when analyzing and comparing differing metaphysical theories?

With regards to my second question concerning the metaphysicians, I would also like to inquire into how exactly it is that there are differing metaphysics and what exactly is supposed to happen if I were to accept one over another?

For example, if I were to accept or believe Aristotle's hylomorphism compared to Cartesian Dualism or even a Materialism, all the while holding a cup in my hand, how does any of that change the cup?

If the cup is only able to be consistently constituted within a framework of hylomorphism because it "makes more sense" than if it were constituted under a framework of Cartesian Dualism, why does it matter, if the cup still looks the same, feels the same, and I can drink from it the same no matter what metaphysical label I decide to buy into while using it?

What exactly is supposed to change depending upon what metaphysical lens or label I decide to apply?

Just my thoughts lmao

@Ajay I honestly don't like what Peterson ever really says. He relies too much on an authoritative outlook of psychology and for that his arguments are weak, for any and all authority can be questioned.

Wow

I’m not sure I can respond to that lol but uh, nice philosophy lesson