Message from @sydtko

Discord ID: 653750057643802635


2019-12-09 23:35:43 UTC  

@Deleted User Hempel's Dilemma

2019-12-09 23:35:50 UTC  

I accept a tautological definition of physical and natural

2019-12-09 23:35:56 UTC  

But reject dualism, because it's not parsimonious

2019-12-09 23:36:07 UTC  

You need not say there's some alternate substance called "the mental"

2019-12-09 23:36:27 UTC  

So... you just eliminate it and use that as a placeholder normatively... (because people have concepts of mental)

2019-12-09 23:36:36 UTC  

A la: people have mental illness (these are physical illness)

2019-12-09 23:37:38 UTC  

Abstracts are contingent on ... the subject or concept holder... unless you're talking about the referent of the abstracts

2019-12-09 23:38:44 UTC  

Impossible = still impossible in possible worlds

2019-12-10 00:04:05 UTC  

P1. Nothing comes from nothing
P2. There is something
C. There has always been something

2019-12-10 00:07:16 UTC  

It's merely aesthetic and the baggage Inspiring Philosophy talks about

2019-12-10 00:07:22 UTC  

They're alternate cosmological models

2019-12-10 00:07:30 UTC  

A - > B -> A

2019-12-10 00:07:39 UTC  

Singularity - > Universe as it is today - > singularity

2019-12-10 00:07:49 UTC  

The evidence points to expanding universe though, that's still not a problem though

2019-12-10 00:08:54 UTC  

1 sec someone's talking to me

2019-12-10 00:09:19 UTC  

the current evidence is the universe is still examnding, however, there are models of Crunch

2019-12-10 00:09:47 UTC  

There's also minor contradiction in the current model in the existence of supermassive blackholes that ought not be there

2019-12-10 00:10:50 UTC  

@AusFox Consensus is Big Freeze

2019-12-10 00:10:58 UTC  

You have a .00000000000000000000000001 / 7 bil theory

2019-12-10 00:11:08 UTC  

So you get your Big Dick Cosmo theory in the memes

2019-12-10 00:11:13 UTC  

👍

2019-12-10 00:11:15 UTC  

Good on you man

2019-12-10 00:12:51 UTC  

@Deleted User I mean... Hume's stuff "The wise man comports himself to the evidence"

2019-12-10 00:13:13 UTC  

But with addendum. What they attribute stuff to X with a mistaken name/label

2019-12-10 00:13:17 UTC  

Or the misattribute

2019-12-10 00:13:36 UTC  

The Liar's Paradox is fine

2019-12-10 00:13:45 UTC  

Destiny probably already believes this

2019-12-10 00:13:51 UTC  

Trivialism is true <:PEPELAUGH:643817011117424708>

2019-12-10 00:14:36 UTC  

@AusFox https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6714/93693da32d0b9c38aad857672021a950486a.pdf on scholastics, it's fun(ny)
And a great meme to defend since people literally want you to justify anything and everything

2019-12-10 00:14:49 UTC  

And then also justify why anything and everything are also false

2019-12-10 00:15:21 UTC  

I'm askign the big crunch justification tho not like your entire philosophical world view basis

2019-12-10 00:15:49 UTC  

It's pretty easy... depends on how bored you are though
T-scheme is a tautology, everything that is and exists is true
In some possible world, instead of using a T-schema (or the moniker/property of true), they use F-schema

2019-12-10 00:15:57 UTC  

And declare everything that is true, false.
So you merely invert T/F value

2019-12-10 00:16:05 UTC  

A la: Everything is false

2019-12-10 00:16:37 UTC  

```Chapter 2: Arguments for Trivialism 1.Introductory Comments 48 2.The Explosive Liar 49 3.The Curry Paradox 54 4.The Argument from the Characterization Principle 56 5.The Argument from Possibilism 63 6.A Cosmological Argument for a Trivial Entity 68 ``` There are the arguments

2019-12-10 00:17:56 UTC  

```2.The Explosive Liar Take the following argument for trivialism 73 :
(1)L is true
(2)It is not the case that L is true
(3)Therefore, trivialism is true

Here L is simply the self-referential liar sentence: ‘L is false’. Note that one could substitute for L any so called dialetheia (i.e. sentence that is both true and false). The most obvious alternative is the Russell paradox generated by the naïve conception of set (i.e. the set of all sets that fail to have self-membership). One then could have as premise (1), ‘R is a member of itself’, and for (2), ‘It is not the case that R is a member of itself’. I will not examine R as an alternative to L, as much of what I have to say about the latter applies to the former. The inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is traditionally known as ex contradictione quodlibet, and it takes the general form of p, ¬p├ q. More recently it has come to be referred to as explosion.
74 ```