Why is that silly? If I imagine people slaving away in African, that sounds undesirable

Just the idea of merely imaging it is unpleasant

Boredom, drudgery

Heat, humidity

And idc because I benifit from it

:^)

<:pepeLMAO:644901342216847388> fair enough

Yeah, same. I benefit from the byproduct of their labor, yes

Ye

I wasn't sure if that's what you meant to say? If you benefit from making me annoyed imagining this hypothetical?

Or receiving the benefits of their labor

Also, it could be both

I see

Enjoying the benefits + enjoying triggering someone

Enjoying the benifits is all

You, I think, most likely... people forced to live in those conditions or merely watch people slave their lives away will necessarily be more empathic towards them though

@Castore You should look over the syllogism and see how it's very bad... intuitively

And there's an equivocation... I went over it twice

@sydtko i think we should norms of assertion based on moores paradox but i dont think thats what the objection above is about this is about,you would have to look into the multiple cognitive collapse objections he makes tbh .

```P1. According to the anti-realist about morality, there are no categorical normative reasons.
p2. If there are no categorical normative reasons, then there are no epistemic reasons for belief.
p3. But there are epistemic reasons for belief.
p4. So there are categorical reasons. (From 2, 3)
c. So the moral anti-realist theory is false. (From 1, 4)```

Yay

And this is why writing is way more important / valuable

He's going from a particular to a general, so he's actually hiding the induction in the deductive premise

"There are no epistemic reasons for belief" means what? ... to me this means agents have reasons to believe particulars. But this doesn't get you to categorical normative reasons

So he's confirming the antecedent

Cat Norm reasons infer epistemic reasons for belief?
P -> Q
Q seems intuitively true

And then he attempts to modus tollens based off the Q

Oh, it's not quite modus tollens, it's another principle

But that's what they're doing

@Castore

```The authors just mentioned present the incoherence objection as an objection related to practical reason. Thus Bernard Williams:

"Whatever the general utility of having a certain rule, if one has actually reached the point of seeing that the utility of breaking it on a certain occasion is greater than that of following it, then surely it would be pure irrationality not to break it?16"```

```And Smart:

"I conclude that in every case if there is a rule R the keeping of which is in general optimific, but such that in a special sort of circumstances the optimific behaviour is to break R, then in these circumstances we should break R. …I can understand ‘it is optimific’ as a reason for action, but why should ‘it is a member of a class of actions which are usually optimific’ or ‘it is a member of a class of actions which as a class are more optimific than any alternative general class’ be a good reason?18"```

@Sasha @Deleted User

@Castore these objections seem very, very weak

@Castore both objections ignore the utility of the rule itself

or: we may consider each act as having two parts: the immediate moral consequences good and the later rule consequences

eg, Act A might have immediate good +10 by saving a life but have long-term good -100 by reducing the strength of the rule

@Deleted User You're doing hempel's dilemma in just defining what physical is

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#HemDil

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hempel%27s_dilemma if you want the short one

(you can also conceptualize this as something like Kant's categorical principle, where I break rule -X and do act X only if its immediate good outweighs its harm to rule -X)