Message from @Sasha

Discord ID: 653753307785068544


2019-12-10 00:12:51 UTC  

@Deleted User I mean... Hume's stuff "The wise man comports himself to the evidence"

2019-12-10 00:13:13 UTC  

But with addendum. What they attribute stuff to X with a mistaken name/label

2019-12-10 00:13:17 UTC  

Or the misattribute

2019-12-10 00:13:36 UTC  

The Liar's Paradox is fine

2019-12-10 00:13:45 UTC  

Destiny probably already believes this

2019-12-10 00:13:51 UTC  

Trivialism is true <:PEPELAUGH:643817011117424708>

2019-12-10 00:14:36 UTC  

@AusFox https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6714/93693da32d0b9c38aad857672021a950486a.pdf on scholastics, it's fun(ny)
And a great meme to defend since people literally want you to justify anything and everything

2019-12-10 00:14:49 UTC  

And then also justify why anything and everything are also false

2019-12-10 00:15:21 UTC  

I'm askign the big crunch justification tho not like your entire philosophical world view basis

2019-12-10 00:15:49 UTC  

It's pretty easy... depends on how bored you are though
T-scheme is a tautology, everything that is and exists is true
In some possible world, instead of using a T-schema (or the moniker/property of true), they use F-schema

2019-12-10 00:15:57 UTC  

And declare everything that is true, false.
So you merely invert T/F value

2019-12-10 00:16:05 UTC  

A la: Everything is false

2019-12-10 00:16:37 UTC  

```Chapter 2: Arguments for Trivialism 1.Introductory Comments 48 2.The Explosive Liar 49 3.The Curry Paradox 54 4.The Argument from the Characterization Principle 56 5.The Argument from Possibilism 63 6.A Cosmological Argument for a Trivial Entity 68 ``` There are the arguments

2019-12-10 00:17:56 UTC  

```2.The Explosive Liar Take the following argument for trivialism 73 :
(1)L is true
(2)It is not the case that L is true
(3)Therefore, trivialism is true

Here L is simply the self-referential liar sentence: ‘L is false’. Note that one could substitute for L any so called dialetheia (i.e. sentence that is both true and false). The most obvious alternative is the Russell paradox generated by the naïve conception of set (i.e. the set of all sets that fail to have self-membership). One then could have as premise (1), ‘R is a member of itself’, and for (2), ‘It is not the case that R is a member of itself’. I will not examine R as an alternative to L, as much of what I have to say about the latter applies to the former. The inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is traditionally known as ex contradictione quodlibet, and it takes the general form of p, ¬p├ q. More recently it has come to be referred to as explosion.
74 ```

2019-12-10 00:18:02 UTC  

Shit formatting since it's pasting from a paper

2019-12-10 00:19:12 UTC  

```3.The Curry Paradox
Recently it has become an industry to take some of the most intractable paradoxes and reinterpret them as sound arguments to controversial conclusions. The most well known example of this is the liar paradox, which is reinterpreted as a sound argument for dialetheism.
Another is the Curry Paradox 82, which I interpret here as a sound argument for trivialism. Take the following sentence, δ: If δ is true, then trivialism.
(1) If δ is true , then if δ is true, then trivialism [by T-schema]
(2) If δ is true, then trivialism [(1) by contraction]
(3) δ is true [(2) by T-schema]
(4) trivialism [(2), (4) by modus ponens]

This is prima facie a sound argument for trivialism – the view that every sentence is true. Indeed, one can modify the argument to prove the truth of any proposition, p, by applying it to the sentence, δ: If δ is true, then p. This would provide the trivialist with independent evidence for each and every one of her beliefs. ```

2019-12-10 00:19:54 UTC  

The characterization principle doesn't have a syllogism

2019-12-10 00:20:38 UTC  

```635.The Argument from Possibilism The next argument for trivialism I wish to spell out can perhaps be dubbed a modal argument for trivialism and can be expressed as follows:
(1)Possibilism is true [prem.]
(2)If possibilism is true, then there is a world (either possible or impossible or both)99, w, in which trivialism is true [prem.] (3)w is a possible world [prem.]
(4)It is true in w that w is identical to the actual world, A [(2)]
(5)If it is true that there is a world, w, and w is a possible world, and it is true in wthat w is identical to A, then trivialism is true [prem.] (6)Trivialism is true [(1)-(5)].

Is premise 1 true? Possibilism is the view that every proposition is possible and is to be contrasted with the view known as necessitarianism: the view that there is at least one impossible proposition. Possibilism has been seriously advocated by a number of philosophers in the last forty years or so.```

2019-12-10 00:21:24 UTC  

```6. A Cosmological Argument for a Trivial Entity Let us define a trivial entity as an entity that instantiates every predicate, i.e. an entity of which everything is true. One of the things true of a trivial entity is that it exists in a reality in which trivialism is true. Hence, if a trivial entity exists, then trivialism is true. But is it true that there exists a trivial entity? Here is an argument for thinking that it is true:

1)Every being (or entity or object) is either trivial or nontrivial
2)It is not the case that every being is nontrivial
3)Hence, there exists a trivial being 107

By a nontrivial being I mean a being which instantiates some but not all predicates. Premise 1) exhausts the logical possibilities. But why think that premise 2) is true? ```

2019-12-10 00:21:40 UTC  

@Sasha There, I even formatted these for your shit

2019-12-10 00:22:14 UTC  

thx

2019-12-10 00:22:38 UTC  

But reading the full essay, while long, is a much more interesting read... because he speaks about why one should not reject trivialism

2019-12-10 00:22:52 UTC  

gib

2019-12-10 00:22:56 UTC  

As it entails every position you already believe as true, and as false

2019-12-10 00:23:09 UTC  

So the importance becomes what you can justify and why

2019-12-10 00:26:18 UTC  

@Deleted User Methode cannot utter gibberish
Methode has uttered gibberish
Conclusion: <:Smug:643129431434461194>

2019-12-10 00:26:41 UTC  

Literally uttered "gibberish"

2019-12-10 00:27:47 UTC  

Or in the most literal senses:
Methode cannot utter gibberish
Method has uttered "Methode cannot utter gibberish"

2019-12-10 01:45:29 UTC  

Human entails agency
But fetus must be human
And if you take potentiality as your angle, then you also have to respect everything that can potentially become a human, at which point, you explode your own system. As your food becomes a human

2019-12-10 01:45:49 UTC  

So you effectively have to become a Jainist by logical consequence

2019-12-10 01:46:33 UTC  

Fetus != human
If fetus = human, just bite the bullet and say you don't give a shit about humans <:Smug:643129431434461194>

2019-12-10 03:06:34 UTC  

sexual orientation: libertarian

2019-12-10 03:08:36 UTC  

@sydtko humans aren't agents necessarily

2019-12-10 03:08:48 UTC  

At least not if we're talking about the species

2019-12-10 03:08:57 UTC  

Babies aren't, for instance

2019-12-10 03:21:17 UTC  
2019-12-10 03:21:38 UTC  

Shut up

2019-12-10 03:21:41 UTC  

Yeah, I think agency could be a presupposition failure...
But if I'm willing to play the game... I don't really care about agency in itself.
It's how you justify lots of things

2019-12-10 03:21:43 UTC  

Shut the fuck up