Message from @Sasha
Discord ID: 653753307785068544
@Deleted User I mean... Hume's stuff "The wise man comports himself to the evidence"
But with addendum. What they attribute stuff to X with a mistaken name/label
Or the misattribute
The Liar's Paradox is fine
Destiny probably already believes this
Trivialism is true <:PEPELAUGH:643817011117424708>
@AusFox https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6714/93693da32d0b9c38aad857672021a950486a.pdf on scholastics, it's fun(ny)
And a great meme to defend since people literally want you to justify anything and everything
And then also justify why anything and everything are also false
I'm askign the big crunch justification tho not like your entire philosophical world view basis
It's pretty easy... depends on how bored you are though
T-scheme is a tautology, everything that is and exists is true
In some possible world, instead of using a T-schema (or the moniker/property of true), they use F-schema
And declare everything that is true, false.
So you merely invert T/F value
A la: Everything is false
```Chapter 2: Arguments for Trivialism 1.Introductory Comments 48 2.The Explosive Liar 49 3.The Curry Paradox 54 4.The Argument from the Characterization Principle 56 5.The Argument from Possibilism 63 6.A Cosmological Argument for a Trivial Entity 68 ``` There are the arguments
```2.The Explosive Liar Take the following argument for trivialism 73 :
(1)L is true
(2)It is not the case that L is true
(3)Therefore, trivialism is true
Here L is simply the self-referential liar sentence: ‘L is false’. Note that one could substitute for L any so called dialetheia (i.e. sentence that is both true and false). The most obvious alternative is the Russell paradox generated by the naïve conception of set (i.e. the set of all sets that fail to have self-membership). One then could have as premise (1), ‘R is a member of itself’, and for (2), ‘It is not the case that R is a member of itself’. I will not examine R as an alternative to L, as much of what I have to say about the latter applies to the former. The inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is traditionally known as ex contradictione quodlibet, and it takes the general form of p, ¬p├ q. More recently it has come to be referred to as explosion.
74 ```
Shit formatting since it's pasting from a paper
```3.The Curry Paradox
Recently it has become an industry to take some of the most intractable paradoxes and reinterpret them as sound arguments to controversial conclusions. The most well known example of this is the liar paradox, which is reinterpreted as a sound argument for dialetheism.
Another is the Curry Paradox 82, which I interpret here as a sound argument for trivialism. Take the following sentence, δ: If δ is true, then trivialism.
(1) If δ is true , then if δ is true, then trivialism [by T-schema]
(2) If δ is true, then trivialism [(1) by contraction]
(3) δ is true [(2) by T-schema]
(4) trivialism [(2), (4) by modus ponens]
This is prima facie a sound argument for trivialism – the view that every sentence is true. Indeed, one can modify the argument to prove the truth of any proposition, p, by applying it to the sentence, δ: If δ is true, then p. This would provide the trivialist with independent evidence for each and every one of her beliefs. ```
The characterization principle doesn't have a syllogism
```635.The Argument from Possibilism The next argument for trivialism I wish to spell out can perhaps be dubbed a modal argument for trivialism and can be expressed as follows:
(1)Possibilism is true [prem.]
(2)If possibilism is true, then there is a world (either possible or impossible or both)99, w, in which trivialism is true [prem.] (3)w is a possible world [prem.]
(4)It is true in w that w is identical to the actual world, A [(2)]
(5)If it is true that there is a world, w, and w is a possible world, and it is true in wthat w is identical to A, then trivialism is true [prem.] (6)Trivialism is true [(1)-(5)].
Is premise 1 true? Possibilism is the view that every proposition is possible and is to be contrasted with the view known as necessitarianism: the view that there is at least one impossible proposition. Possibilism has been seriously advocated by a number of philosophers in the last forty years or so.```
```6. A Cosmological Argument for a Trivial Entity Let us define a trivial entity as an entity that instantiates every predicate, i.e. an entity of which everything is true. One of the things true of a trivial entity is that it exists in a reality in which trivialism is true. Hence, if a trivial entity exists, then trivialism is true. But is it true that there exists a trivial entity? Here is an argument for thinking that it is true:
1)Every being (or entity or object) is either trivial or nontrivial
2)It is not the case that every being is nontrivial
3)Hence, there exists a trivial being 107
By a nontrivial being I mean a being which instantiates some but not all predicates. Premise 1) exhausts the logical possibilities. But why think that premise 2) is true? ```
But reading the full essay, while long, is a much more interesting read... because he speaks about why one should not reject trivialism
gib
As it entails every position you already believe as true, and as false
So the importance becomes what you can justify and why
@Deleted User Methode cannot utter gibberish
Methode has uttered gibberish
Conclusion: <:Smug:643129431434461194>
Literally uttered "gibberish"
Or in the most literal senses:
Methode cannot utter gibberish
Method has uttered "Methode cannot utter gibberish"
Human entails agency
But fetus must be human
And if you take potentiality as your angle, then you also have to respect everything that can potentially become a human, at which point, you explode your own system. As your food becomes a human
So you effectively have to become a Jainist by logical consequence
Fetus != human
If fetus = human, just bite the bullet and say you don't give a shit about humans <:Smug:643129431434461194>
sexual orientation: libertarian
At least not if we're talking about the species
Babies aren't, for instance
@ Tyler🔥 Lol wtf am I Darth Vader
Shut up
Yeah, I think agency could be a presupposition failure...
But if I'm willing to play the game... I don't really care about agency in itself.
It's how you justify lots of things
Shut the fuck up