Cat Norm reasons infer epistemic reasons for belief?
P -> Q
Q seems intuitively true

And then he attempts to modus tollens based off the Q

Oh, it's not quite modus tollens, it's another principle

But that's what they're doing

@Castore

```The authors just mentioned present the incoherence objection as an objection related to practical reason. Thus Bernard Williams:

"Whatever the general utility of having a certain rule, if one has actually reached the point of seeing that the utility of breaking it on a certain occasion is greater than that of following it, then surely it would be pure irrationality not to break it?16"```

```And Smart:

"I conclude that in every case if there is a rule R the keeping of which is in general optimific, but such that in a special sort of circumstances the optimific behaviour is to break R, then in these circumstances we should break R. …I can understand ‘it is optimific’ as a reason for action, but why should ‘it is a member of a class of actions which are usually optimific’ or ‘it is a member of a class of actions which as a class are more optimific than any alternative general class’ be a good reason?18"```

@Sasha @Deleted User

@Castore these objections seem very, very weak

@Castore both objections ignore the utility of the rule itself

or: we may consider each act as having two parts: the immediate moral consequences good and the later rule consequences

eg, Act A might have immediate good +10 by saving a life but have long-term good -100 by reducing the strength of the rule

@Deleted User You're doing hempel's dilemma in just defining what physical is

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#HemDil

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hempel%27s_dilemma if you want the short one

(you can also conceptualize this as something like Kant's categorical principle, where I break rule -X and do act X only if its immediate good outweighs its harm to rule -X)

(ie, if everyone were also to do this under similar circumstances)

@sydtko thats a horrible version of the CiG theres a diffrence beetwen entailments,analogy,absortption and then theres another argument about how you could argue for the parity premise . There are arguments for the view that epistemic reasons have to be normative in order to avoid self defeat because and against instrumentalism and epistemic pluralism the above version of the argument doesnt defend the existence premise very well either .

In short ```On the one hand, we may define the physical as whatever is currently explained by our best physical theories, e.g., quantum mechanics, general relativity. Though many would find this definition unsatisfactory, some would accept that we have at least a general understanding of the physical based on these theories, and can use them to assess what is physical and what is not. And therein lies the rub, as a worked-out explanation of mentality currently lies outside the scope of such theories. ``` I don't buy that mentality is outside these theories

Mentality is very much within physical theories

When you're using normative are you using it as moral or probabilistic?

It's moral, obvious, in the sense that you make a choice to follow the normative rules of meaning of words. (rule following paradox)
But... the whole point is you can conceive of a thinker that doesn't get the same normative rules

And thus, does not act in accord with the rules. Or acts in opposition to the ruleset (which is its own ruleset)

This is why an appeal to normativity is never compelling

Well... I should not say "never"..

How does pluralism not defend an existence premise?

Unless you're saying a premise of existence is normatively held by all agents?

I am actually having so much cancer, I hate philo jargon

The norms of thought on how they think about their own existence are irrelevant to the brute facts...

@actual_communist_boi he amends the objections in the paper he isnt making the same objection iirc he says that in the next paragraphs.

So... I can break this by merely doing
"I don't exist" --> contraction that demonstrates I exist

So how I state or think about my existence changes nothing substantive to the brute fact (I don't fully believe this btw)

But when facing someone that seems far more skeptical to realist metaphysics ... then I kind of have to assert it with this sort of language

<:REEE:644893026165981184> type slow

Oh no... Methode is running baseline cogito meme <:feelsbadman:643817668394090506>

@sydtko i said epistemic pluralism has been a responce against the epistemic existence premise in the way the CIG formulates it .All the other stuff you are saying arent self defeat arguments that defend the epistemic existenc premise or atleast the ones im reffering to i could dm them to you later if you want but you should stop trying to guess.

I'm assuming you mean companions in guilt = COG? Why is it an O?

```One might object that any formulation of physicalism which utilizes the theory-based conception will be either trivial or false.``` HELL YEA.... Jumping on board that trivialist boat

@Deleted User The belief that math reduces into prop logic is logicism

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logicism/

``` Both versions of logicism—strong and weak—maintain that

All the objects forming the subject matter of those branches of mathematics are logical objects; and
Logic—in some suitably general and powerful sense that the logicist will have to define—is capable of furnishing definitions of the primitive concepts of these branches of mathematics, allowing one to derive the mathematician’s ‘first principles’ therein as results within Logic itself. (The branch of mathematics in question is thereby said to have been reduced to Logic.)
```