I am on the snail spectrum

Respect me

These two views are respectively termed determinism and
indeterminism. To begin to understand the relevance of these views to the
question of the freedom of minds, note that one main difference between
them is that by determinism the future of such a mind’s function is locally
(in the next moment) “closed,” and by indeterminism the future of
a mind is locally “open.”

to who wanted to fuck a reptile

well

yiff

That is, by determinism a given state of mind at
one present moment causes one, and only one, state of mind in the next
future moment as an effect. All other conceivably different future states of
mind relative to the present one are “closed” off by the present causal one.
By contrast, the indeterminism of a given present state of mind that is not
causal is “open” to at least two alternative local future states of mind.

Satanacism

Thats satanacism

zeph

you christian

One can see that these two views have one immediate tie - in to opinions about
the freedom of such minds. If our minds’ futures are always closed by determinism,
then those futures based on our “choices” only go one particular
way and no other. By indeterminism, on the other hand, our futures are at
least sometimes open to this future and that future, as the 1980s Modern
English song Melt with You goes, “the future’s open wide!” So it may seem
that determinism robs us of a free will to choose between distinct futures
and indeterminism restores it.

Unfortunately, things are more complicated than that in part because,
depending on what exactly “freedom” means, each of the determinist or
indeterminist views of minds can lay claim to free will, and one can be
made to exclude it as well. It all depends on what free will ability is supposed
to be, and what opportunity or opportunities are additionally needed,
and what determinism and indeterminism can provide in terms of these
components of freedom

rick and morty ^

Say, for example, that a determinist interprets an ability to make a free
choice as weighing options and coming up with the best one. Sophisticated
computers can do this, and they are essentially causal mechanisms (their
functional states are such that their futures are always locally closed). So a
determinist view of mind can accommodate such an account of ability and
thus regard our minds to be a form of mechanistic supercomputer.

head too small

LOL

wtf put it back @Dominic

i want to pin it

@JacobFox I was not for a long time but I am going after Christianity now. I think it is great for people. I am just having trouble figuring out exactly what it means to be christian and trying to feel such a pressence

Say then also that the determinist puts forward an additional account that states, for
example, if a mind is caused to select the best it can in a situation, and that
selection is objectively correct, proper, and satisfactory (by some measure),
then it is properly freely chosen because no other possible future course of
that mind would make sense. Such a view combining deterministic ability
with the sufficiency of just one future opportunity is in fact called a compatibilist
account of freedom, and some like, believing determinists dub
themselves thus.

@trent i didnt remove it

ascended rick and morty fan

SKACHUAN

But what if, to the contrary, such a closed future is deemed insuffi cient
for freedom? (That the future, to be freely chosen, should be “open wide.”)
For example, what if the best a mind can select in a situation is a fifty - fifty
proposition of heads or tails, without any further preference between the
two?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GC5rAX0xHg

<:HyperRage:354350216767340549>

A determinist account of this mind says that one actually is preferred,
for one is fi nally caused to be selected over the other. But here indeterminists
cry foul—how can that one be truly freely chosen if the other is
equally preferred? Truly free choices in these circumstances demand that
both future alternatives are available for choosing. This means that any
such choice requires plural opportunities in the future—and real ones, in
a genuinely open future way

And if that is correct, determinism is false, at
least for minds that are conceived as free in this way (so they can’t be supercomputers).
So for philosophers that demand such a plurality of future
opportunities for any stated ability of mind to choose freely, freedom is
incompatible with a determinist account of the locally closed future. Such
philosophers of freedom are termed incompatibilists; they hold that the necessity
of the plurality of opportunities for choice cannot be reconciled
with locally closed future determinism.

@trent u can check logs to find out the mod that deleted it <:GWchadThink:366999782348292108>

Incompatibilist, indeterminists, sometimes called libertarians—believe that minds at least sometimes
function in indeterminist ways, and when they do, the plurality of future
opportunities assures that this free will to choose actually exists.