Once drawn, that line can be
extended along its trajectory to suggest where we might look for more and
new data. If the original data suggest a particular line, then, statistically
speaking, we can expect to fi nd similar evidence along an extension of the
same line.

If the original data, to put this another way, suggest a particular
line of inquiry, then, if we follow that line, we can expect to find more evidence
like the evidence we started with.

Of course, in any scientific measurement
not all the data, or even most of it, will line up perfectly. The
data are always somewhat loosely clustered or scattered into a rough shape
of some sort, but even a general clumping of data is enough to suggest
where you can draw a line that describes most of them. An educated guess
at where to draw the line is abductive. Looking for data to confi rm the line,
after it is drawn, is inductive.

Once a hypothesis has been well established, once we fi nd a lot of
data points where an extension of the line predicted they would be, or
when we continue to find evidence that maps into our same, original, cluster, we
have good reason to become suspicious of new data points that
fall too far from the line.

In other words, once we have enough evidence
to believe our hypothesis is true, new evidence that does not confi rm our
hypothesis will not be easily accepted. In fact, data points might show up
so far off the line that we can reasonably suspect that they are not real data
at all but artifacts of the measurement or mistakes in our observations: like
a smudge on the lens we mistake for a distant galaxy, or a glowing weather
balloon we mistake for a UFO, or even, perhaps, crazy observations that
belong to a category we have to label with a variable like “X."

Points like this, well off the line of an accepted hypothesis, are called “radical outliers.”

Inductive method tells us that when enough radical outliers appear,
like a second flock of data points landing adjacent to the fl ock we used
to draw our original line, they stop being radical outliers and begin to
suggest that our initial data set was not large enough.

A lot of new points suggest that we got it wrong from the start and that our original line needs
to be bent or shifted to include them, or that we may have found an entirely
separate line of evidence, a second hypothesis we need to look into.

Scientists with well - established theories will assert in public that when
suffi cient amounts of new, nonconfi rmatory, data enter the system, the
hypothesis will be swapped out for one that accounts for the new data,
but this is never what happens.

Once accepted, hypotheses have their own
inertia. Once we adopt a hypothesis, usually based on a relatively small
sample size, we are reluctant to let go of it, regardless of how many radical
outliers we find later. A great deal of both data and psychological motivation
is required to force us to reexamine hypotheses and explanations we
have accepted and to which we have grown accustomed.

It seemed crazy to fifteenth - century scientists, for instance, to think that Earth orbited the
sun. What is interesting is that it was not a preponderance of new data that
changed Copernicus’s mind about the relation of the sun and Earth.

The hypothesis was changed, not by a flood of radical outliers or new data, but
by a reformulation of Ptolemy’s hypothesis into one that would explain all
the data more economically. Prior to this, data suggesting a different, non -
Ptolemaic, orbital arrangement were ignored, ridiculed, or bent into pre -
Copernican orbits in increasingly dizzying ways.

The power and inertia of a previously accepted hypothesis kept even Einstein clinging to his narrower
vision of the universe long after quantum mechanics began to raise
serious questions about God and dice

So to investigate whether anyone has free will, we must first be clear what
we’re talking about and looking for, the conceptual nature of freedom
and free will. Philosophers have put forward various accounts of what
constitutes some conditions of human freedom: lack of constraints, open -
future choice, reasons - responsiveness, capability of being held responsible,
and so on.

However, following J. L. Austin and some others, let’s generalize
from these more focused suggestions and say that freedom in general
always requires two interrelated components of ability and opportunity (or
opportunities—more about this in a moment).

The idea here is roughly that one can be free if and only if one is able to be free in some relevant
way, such as being able to think, speak, move, and so on, and one has a
course of thought or action open to the exercise of such abilities, so one
isn’t unduly distracted, one’s lips aren’t duct - taped, one isn’t superglued to
the floor, and so on.

Note that freedom in general then is a state of affairs
where one has some sort of internal capacity or power, and one has as well
an external situation so that that capacity or power can complete its function.
Only when both these internal and external conditions obtain can
one be said to be truly free to think, to speak, to move.

Applying this picture of freedom to the specific issue of free will requires
a bit of explanation. To begin, philosophers are for the most part
divided into two mutually exclusive camps that are at odds on the question
of how human brains and/or conscious minds function.

The question here is whether the basis of consciousness is only an immensely complex system
of causes and effects, such as a purely biological account of thought might
provide, or whether consciousness might include deviation from the strict
rule of cause and effect, for example by appeal to quantum physics or supernaturalism.

These two views are respectively termed determinism and
indeterminism. To begin to understand the relevance of these views to the
question of the freedom of minds, note that one main difference between
them is that by determinism the future of such a mind’s function is locally
(in the next moment) “closed,” and by indeterminism the future of
a mind is locally “open.”

That is, by determinism a given state of mind at
one present moment causes one, and only one, state of mind in the next
future moment as an effect. All other conceivably different future states of
mind relative to the present one are “closed” off by the present causal one.
By contrast, the indeterminism of a given present state of mind that is not
causal is “open” to at least two alternative local future states of mind.

One can see that these two views have one immediate tie - in to opinions about
the freedom of such minds. If our minds’ futures are always closed by determinism,
then those futures based on our “choices” only go one particular
way and no other. By indeterminism, on the other hand, our futures are at
least sometimes open to this future and that future, as the 1980s Modern
English song Melt with You goes, “the future’s open wide!” So it may seem
that determinism robs us of a free will to choose between distinct futures
and indeterminism restores it.

Unfortunately, things are more complicated than that in part because,
depending on what exactly “freedom” means, each of the determinist or
indeterminist views of minds can lay claim to free will, and one can be
made to exclude it as well. It all depends on what free will ability is supposed
to be, and what opportunity or opportunities are additionally needed,
and what determinism and indeterminism can provide in terms of these
components of freedom

Say, for example, that a determinist interprets an ability to make a free
choice as weighing options and coming up with the best one. Sophisticated
computers can do this, and they are essentially causal mechanisms (their
functional states are such that their futures are always locally closed). So a
determinist view of mind can accommodate such an account of ability and
thus regard our minds to be a form of mechanistic supercomputer.

Say then also that the determinist puts forward an additional account that states, for
example, if a mind is caused to select the best it can in a situation, and that
selection is objectively correct, proper, and satisfactory (by some measure),
then it is properly freely chosen because no other possible future course of
that mind would make sense. Such a view combining deterministic ability
with the sufficiency of just one future opportunity is in fact called a compatibilist
account of freedom, and some like, believing determinists dub
themselves thus.

But what if, to the contrary, such a closed future is deemed insuffi cient
for freedom? (That the future, to be freely chosen, should be “open wide.”)
For example, what if the best a mind can select in a situation is a fifty - fifty
proposition of heads or tails, without any further preference between the
two?

A determinist account of this mind says that one actually is preferred,
for one is fi nally caused to be selected over the other. But here indeterminists
cry foul—how can that one be truly freely chosen if the other is
equally preferred? Truly free choices in these circumstances demand that
both future alternatives are available for choosing. This means that any
such choice requires plural opportunities in the future—and real ones, in
a genuinely open future way

And if that is correct, determinism is false, at
least for minds that are conceived as free in this way (so they can’t be supercomputers).
So for philosophers that demand such a plurality of future
opportunities for any stated ability of mind to choose freely, freedom is
incompatible with a determinist account of the locally closed future. Such
philosophers of freedom are termed incompatibilists; they hold that the necessity
of the plurality of opportunities for choice cannot be reconciled
with locally closed future determinism.

Incompatibilist, indeterminists, sometimes called libertarians—believe that minds at least sometimes
function in indeterminist ways, and when they do, the plurality of future
opportunities assures that this free will to choose actually exists.

So there are determinists who believe that compatibilist freedom exists,
and indeterminists who believe that incompatibilist freedom exists. But
now for a moment think hard (so to speak) on this matter of incompatibilism.
Incompatibilism as a belief is only a very abstract conceptual view
about the philosophical need for locally plural open - future opportunities
for freedom of choice and does not commit to whether such a future exists.

Thus there are some determinists who agree with this view, and since they
are also determinists about minds, reject any belief in such freedom of mind
and will. For them the truth of determinism rules out such incompatibilist
free will. They are called hard incompatibilists, determinists who do not
believe that the opportunities form of free will exists.

Does this answer your question now?

You should have listened

Ya missed out

Did any of you read the shit I posted like fuck

The Celts brought the Germans out of the caves

^

WTF do you do @somerussianguy

Fugging lies

@somerussianguy you dont make shit

https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Tax-Framework_1pager.pdf

Taxes are for other shit like roads and other shit etc.

Need less spending

Then less taxes

He who has the best mic wins

How is the country then @somerussianguy supposed to work

At one point in the pipe line do you stop that then @somerussianguy

lol

No

Just stop everything and start over again

The federal reserve fucked everybody

But is the IRS doing it willfully ?

Or are they cunts too

So then

Reset

Nothing is gona happen unless every single person stops doing bullshit all at once in order to reset every thing

It could stop all of this over night

Literally

It would be nice to have every one though

Go on about the critical mass of people who dont file taxes @somerussianguy

Later then

Death taxes

When did you get this email

Back then

I wouldnt doubt it

I know bro

What the fuck are you saying in Russian

@Grand_Trollface🎃

Literally rapes kids

Catholics

>assumes

One bad apple

I will but hey

Not gona stick around

Who cares

Fuck

Its all based on faith, all other aspects of it is alright ya know

Good for people

How to live

etc.

Hey

What in the hell is this low salt shit

http://boards.4chan.org/pol/thread/146536402

Is it a lie

Of course

But to much is of course not good

Ya

@somerussianguy one of the videos make a good point that people used to eat way more salt because thats how food was preserved, and now that refrigerators took over hypertension has gone up

Mhmm

Whats the better salt then